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JUST SAY NO TO WHOM?
Ronald J. Gilson*
INTRODUCTION
"Just say no" is the current rallying cry of those seeking to give tar-
get management the unrestricted power to block hostile tender offers.
Not surprisingly, the turn of phrase chosen by management leaves ambig-
uous the precise issue on which the debate should turn: To whom does
management want the power to say no? As target management poses the
issue, it wants to say no to a raider. The image is of stalwart management
protecting shareholders against a marauding outsider. However, that im-
age is seriously misleading. In fact, target management seeks the power to
say no to its own shareholders.
The recent case of TW Services, Inc. v. SWT Acquisition Corp.' il-
lustrates the point. After 88% of the target stock had been tendered in
response to a hostile offer, the target's chairman admitted that "I think
the stockholders like the [tender offer] price."2 Thus, when target man-
agement blocked the offer by declining to redeem its poison pill, it was, in
effect, saying no to 88% of the company's shareholders. So understood,
demands of critics that management justify its right to tell shareholders
no are not surprising. Normally we don't allow the agent's preferences to
trump those of the principal.
My goal in this article is to sketch a critical history of the justifica-
tions proponents have offered for giving target management the power to
tell shareholders no. This history reveals three categories of justifications:
legal, paternalistic and social. It also reveals a dramatic shift in the na-
ture of the categories. The focus has moved from claims that blocking an
offer benefits shareholders, to the very different claim that management
is warranted in blocking an offer even if doing so is detrimental to share-
holders. To telegraph where I'm going, the simple fact is that none of the
proffered justifications hold up to analysis, a point that bears emphasis at
this stage of the debate when it has become commonplace for courts to
set forth potential justifications in a veritable litany, without pausing to
establish the plausibility of any single justification. That leaves for last
what may be the most interesting question of all: What is the real expla-
nation for management's tenacious campaign for the right to "just say
* Professor of Law, Stanford University. This article, an earlier version of which ap-
peared in the June 26, 1989, edition of the Legal Times at p. 19, was written while I was a
Visiting Scholar at The Hoover Institution, to which I am grateful for research support. I
am also grateful to Connie Hellyer for editorial assistance.
1. [1988-89 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 94,344 (Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 1989).
2. Id. at 92,177.
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no"?
To put the discussion of justifications in context and to simplify
things just a little, assume a 100% cash offer at a premium, with an un-
conditional commitment to a second-step merger in which non-tendering
shareholders would receive the same cash price-the type of offer that
the Delaware Chancery Court has repeatedly found to be noncoercive' In
this setting, what would justify allowing management to tell shareholders
no?
I. LEGAL JUSTIFICATIONS
The initial set of justifications, dating to the late 1970's, consisted of
legal-style arguments that relied on analogy to support management's
power to block a hostile tender offer. Given that management had the
power to block transactions that were claimed to be the functional
equivalents of tender offers, it should also have the power to block tender
offers.
The argument took two forms. The managerialists first argued that
tender offers were of no greater moment than other important transac-
tions made solely by management-like investing in a new plant or decid-
ing to enter a new market.
No one took this argument very seriously. What distinguishes tender
offers from corporate investment and marketing decisions is that the cen-
tral purpose of tender offers is change in control. Even state corporate
statutes require special decision procedures for transactions, like mergers
and asset sales, which involve transfers of control.
Recognizing that a tender offer inevitably contemplates a control
transfer gave rise to the second analogy. By requiring director approval of
mergers or sales of assets, state corporate statutes explicitly grant direc-
tors the right to just say no to these types of control transactions. Be-
cause a tender offer has the same result as a merger or sale of assets, the
argument goes, management should have the same authority with respect
to a tender offer.
The problem with this justification is its impact on the structure of
the corporation's governance. If accepted, it would give management a
virtual monopoly on the market for corporate control: Management could
not be displaced without its own permission. This would raise the specter
of a quite different analogy: a governance structure for profit-making cor-
porations analogous to the explicitly self-perpetuating governance struc-
ture for nonprofit organizations. In the typical nonprofit corporation,
members of the board of directors are elected by the corporation's voting
members who, in turn, are defined as the members of the board. Recog-
nizing the absence of any organizational constraint on management be-
3. See, e.g., Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp., [1988-89 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 94,340 (Del. Ch. 1989); Grand Metro. Pub. Ltd. v. Pillsbury Co., 558
A.2d 1049 (Del. Ch. 1988); City Capital Assocs. Ltd. v. Interco, Inc., 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch.
1988); AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103 (Del. Ch. 1986).
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havior, the conduct of nonprofit corporations is typically subject to
scrutiny by the state attorney general.
Pro-management advocates responded by pointing out that even if
management can block tender offers, in addition to mergers and sales of
assets, it still can be displaced through corporate political action-i.e., the
hostile offeror can still wage a proxy contest. That response, however,
gives away the game. Once management concedes that some way must
exist to displace it without its permission, the issue reduces to whether a
proxy contest is an effective displacement technique. Pro-management
advocates have never attempted to demonstrate that, despite manage-
ment domination of the proxy machinery and the collective action
problems associated with shareholder voting, a proxy contest provides an
effective way to displace management.4 Moreover, a neutral observer
might express real skepticism whether management truly wants the proxy
system to function as an effective displacement mechanism. Recent case
law is replete with management efforts to erect barriers to shareholder
use of proxies, and recent state legislation restricting, for example, share-
holders' right to call special shareholder meetings hardly makes the proxy
process more effective.
In all events, these legal justifications never made much headway. By
adopting a proportionality test for defensive tactics in Unocal Corp. v.
Mesa Petroleum Co.,5 the Delaware Supreme Court rejected the claim
that management's role in tender offers should be the same as in mergers
and sales of assets.
II. PATERNALISTIC JUSTIFICATIONS
The next set of justifications rested on paternalism. To benefit share-
holders in general-or at least a particularly worthy subset of sharehold-
ers-management must prevent shareholders from choosing for
themselves. This approach at least had the attraction of irony. There was
something wonderful about corporate management joining with the Criti-
cal Legal Studies movement6 in resurrecting paternalism as a policy coun-
terweight to the Reagan era's focus on deregulation.
The first paternalistic justification sharply distinguished two catego-
ries of shareholders: good shareholders who are interested in the long-
term future of the corporation; and bad shareholders (arbitrageurs and
speculators) who are interested in short-term trading profits. In this view,
blocking a tender offer is necessary to protect the good shareholders. If
management doesn't act, bad shareholders, who will come to hold most of
4. See Pound, Proxy Contests and the Efficiency of Shareholder Oversight, Discus-
sion Paper No. 166D, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University (March 1988)
(helpfully surveys the barriers to the conduct of a proxy fight and offers empirical evidence
of their lack of success).
5. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
6. See, e.g., Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalistic Motives in Contract and Tort
Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD.
L. REV. 563 (1982).
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the stock of a company that is in play, will choose to tender their shares
and the takeover will succeed.
This argument has never held together, largely because the function
of arbitrageurs in tender offers belies the distinction between short-term
speculation and long-term investment. Arbitrageurs undertake the risk
that a tender offer will not succeed by acquiring their shares from risk-
averse, long-term shareholders. Thus, it is hardly surprising that arbi-
trageurs always favor a tender offer. Arbitrageurs, in effect, stand as less
risk-averse surrogates for long-term investors who have already demon-
strated, by selling their shares to the arbitrageurs, that they perceived the
long-term value of the company was exceeded by the size of the premium.
In other words, arbitrageurs can only acquire shares when a company's
long-term shareholders choose to sell them.
Although distaste for arbitrageurs still hangs heavy in the air, man-
agement more recently has identified a new category of disfavored share-
holders whose interests can be appropriately disregarded to protect
others. The new villains are the institutional shareholders who, like arbi-
trageurs, are said to be interested only in short-term profits.
It is puzzling why the fact that a majority of the shares of many ma-
jor corporations are now held by institutional investors somehow entitles
management to ignore the interests of its majority shareholders. But puz-
zles aside, this justification founders on the same rock that sank the arbi-
trageur argument. In both cases, pro-management advocates ignore the
fact that the disfavored category of shareholders holds their stock in a
representative capacity. Just as arbitrageurs hold their shares as proxies
for the long-term shareholders who sold out, institutional investors act on
behalf of those who hold the beneficial interests in the institutional inves-
tors themselves. If the argument is that the managers of institutional in-
vestors are disregarding the best interests of their own beneficiaries, then
a variety of legal protections, starting with simple fiduciary duty to
ERISA,7 are available to protect the institutional investors' beneficiaries.
The target company's management, two levels removed, is an unlikely
source of additional protection.
The second paternalistic justification for allowing target management
to save ghareholders from themselves rests on an empirical claim: that
management blocking an offer makes shareholders better off, because the
value of the company's stock subsequently will appreciate by an amount
greater than the takeover premium. Stated simply, the claim is that
shareholder wealth increases when management defeats a hostile offer.
This was the pro-management forces' favorite argument because it
could be framed in traditional terms-that management was acting to
maximize the value of the shareholders' investment. The problem was
that the argument turned out to be empirically incorrect.
Whether shareholders benefit when management keeps the target
7. Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1982). This law
governs the operation of most private pension and benefit plans.
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company independent by blocking a hostile offer by now has been empiri-
cally tested repeatedly with consistent results. Although a minority of
companies do benefit, on average shareholders of a target company that
remains independent after blocking an offer would have been significantly
better off had they taken the offer.' The poison pill studies are a good
example. Data show that a pill increases the premium paid to target
shareholders when it is used to initiate an auction. However, when the
pill is used to keep the target company independent-to "just say no" to
the shareholders-the data show that shareholders lose. Thus, manage-
ment's fear of putting a poison pill to a shareholder vote seems well
founded; a pill that in the end allows management to "just say no" simply
isn't in the shareholders' interests.' Interestingly, the data also suggest
that shareholders might be amenable (I apologize for coining yet another
awful phrase) to a "time release" pill. Such a pill would allow target man-
agement to block an offer for a period long enough to initiate an auction,
but short enough that it could not be used as a subterfuge for keeping the
company independent.
III. SOCIAL JUSTIFICATIONS (OR "LET THEM EAT CAKE")
As it became increasingly clear that paternalism did not make share-
holders better off, management turned to a group of justifications involv-
ing presumed benefits that accrue generally to the economy and society.
Thus, management in all its wisdom should have the discretion to block a
hostile offer even if its own shareholders are made worse off.
The most familiar of these social justifications builds on the claim
that takeovers result in short-term management which, in turn, has
caused the United States to become less competitive internationally. Pe-
ter Drucker has been the leading exponent of the competitiveness justifi-
cation (and it clearly has been the most popular story told by
businessmen testifying at congressional hearings). As Drucker puts it,
"[A] good many experienced business leaders I know now hold takeover
fear to be a main cause of the decline in America's competitive strength
in the world economy. . .[i]t contributes to the obsession with the short
term." 10 We would all be made better off (even if target shareholders are
made worse off), the argument goes, if managers could block hostile take-
overs. Then they would feel secure enough to return to long-term man-
agement which, after all, is what we really want them to do.
At one level, the short-term management justification for just saying
no is difficult to evaluate. The evidence offered to support the claim that
8. Judge Easterbrook recently summarized the evidence: "The best available data
show that if a firm fends off a bid, its profits decline, and its stock price (adjusted for
inflation and market-wide changes) never tops the initial bid, even if it is later acquired by
another firm." Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 877 F.2d 496, 501 (7th
Cir. 1989).
9. The relevant studies are summarized in R. GasoN & R KRAAKMAN, 1989 SUPPLE-
MENT To GmSON's THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE AcQuIsrrMONs 133-38 (1989).
10. Drucker, Taming the Corporate Takeover, Wall St. J., Oct. 30, 1984, at 30, col. 3.
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takeovers cause short-term management, which in turn causes interna-
tional economic decline, fits the description of what I have heard referred
to as the lawyer's definition of data: the plural of anecdote. The syllogism
runs like this: In the post-war period, the economies of Germany and Ja-
pan have done very well internationally. Hostile takeovers are not possi-
ble in these countries. In contrast, the United States' economy has not
done well. Hostile takeovers are possible in the United States. The con-
clusion, of course, is that if managers could "just say no," we would do
well economically too.
Taking the argument on its face (and overcoming the urge to dissect
one-dimensional, cross-cultural analysis), the short-term management
justification can be tested empirically with about as much analytic rigor
as it embodies. A testable hypothesis would be: If takeovers have caused
our international decline, then those U.S. industries that have not exper-
ienced takeover pressure should be the most successful in meeting inter-
national competition. Our automobile industry, which has experienced no
takeover pressure in the post-war period, perfectly fits the description.
Yet, one would be hard-pressed to find an industry that has been less
successful in meeting foreign competition. Even at the level of anecdotal
empiricism at which the justification is proffered, it doesn't survive
scrutiny.
The second "damn the shareholders" justification builds on the pro-
position that directors owe a responsibility not just to shareholders, but
also to "stakeholders"-the corporation's employees, local communities,
suppliers, and the like. The implication is that target directors should
have the power to "just say no" to an offer favorable to shareholders if it
would be unfavorable to stakeholders.
Whether expressed in corporate charters or in recent state statutes,
the stakeholder justification for blocking hostile takeovers seems quite
disingenuous. The problem is that the justification gives management the
power to consider stakeholders' interests, but does not make them ac-
countable if the stakeholders believe that their interests are given too lit-
tle weight. Suppose management declines an offer of twenty-three dollars
a share on the basis of stakeholder interests, but then accepts the same
offer when the price is raised to twenty-five dollars. Unless stakeholders
are given standing to challenge that decision, it is difficult to take man-
agement's profession of concern for stakeholder interests very seriously.
Moreover, one cannot help being uneasy about a justification which is
not evenhanded in its application. Management claims the right to block
a takeover because, for example, the would-be acquirer might close
plants. But stakeholders have precisely the same concern when the com-
pany's original management closes a plant. Management's profession of
concern for stakeholders would be a great deal more credible if, at the
same time, management sought the right to block a takeover because of
anticipated plant closings by the acquirer, it also supported plant-closing
legislation that protected stakeholders from its own actions.
The final entry in the social justification category also sacrifices
shareholder interests to those of a larger group. The idea is that manage-
[Vol. 25
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ment must be able to block a hostile takeover, even if shareholders would
benefit from the takeover, because hostile takeovers are bad for the econ-
omy. Note that it is not takeovers in general that are disapproved, but
only hostile takeovers. The premise seems to be that takeovers which
management approve are good for the economy, but takeovers which they
reject are not. I can understand wanting to identify ahead of time which
acquisitions would have a positive and which a negative macroeconomic
effect; and I can imagine, as a matter of public policy, that shareholders
might have to take a back seat to general societal concerns. What I have
difficulty understanding is why target management approval would be
thought to separate between socially good and socially bad acquisitions.
Indeed, the empirical evidence seems to run in precisely the opposite
direction. Harvard Business School Professor Michael Porter studied the
track records of thirty-three large U.S. companies' efforts to diversify
from 1950 to 1986. He found that where companies entered an unrelated
line of business by acquisition prior to 1975, almost seventy-five percent
of the acquisitions were subsequently divested.11 Commentators like John
Smale, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Proctor & Gamble Co.,
have relied on Porter's data to argue that hostile takeovers are bad for
the economy.12 The problem is that Smale gets it precisely backwards.
The overwhelming majority of pre-1975 acquisitions, especially by large
companies of the sort that comprise Porter's sample, were friendly, not
hostile acquisitions. Thus the Porter data show only that friendly acquisi-
tion don't work. Indeed, in searching for a company that has successfully
diversified by acquisition, Porter identifies Hanson Trust, a noted hostile
acquirer. 3
IV. WHAT'S THE REAL EXPLANATION?
If all the proffered justifications for allowing target management to
"just say no" do not withstand analysis, then what is the real explana-
tion? The short answer, I think, is management entrenchment. However,
I have in mind not the venal concept of management entrenchment famil-
iar in case law, where even independent directors self-servingly seek to
keep their positions (and egos) intact at shareholder expense. Rather,
what I imagine is at work is a deeply felt belief that a corporation is not
an artificial entity which is the puppet of its shareholder owners, but is
rather a living, independent entity-like Pinocchio, a real boy-with crit-
ical social, political, and economic roles to play.
It may come as a surprise to some that, in the United States, this
organic view of the corporation is associated with Adolph Berle, more
widely recognized for having emphasized the impact on shareholders of
11. Porter, From Competitive Strategy to Corporate Strategy, 87 HARv. Bus. REV. 43
(May-June 1987).
12. Smale, What About Shareowners' Responsibility?, Wall St. J., Oct. 16, 1987, at 28,
col. 3.
13. See, e.g., Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264 (2d Cir.
1986).
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the separation of ownership and control. 14 As Yale Professor Roberta Ro-
mano has noted, Berle "refers to the modern corporation as the 'collective
soul' and the 'consciousness-carrier of 20th century American society.' s15
If one perceives the corporation this way, the question of who runs such
an important social institution transcends shareholder interest in the
price of their stock. In my mind, the often vigorous resistance of hostile
takeovers by independent directors reflects their good faith belief that
large corporations run by operating management with the guidance of
traditional, independent directors will better serve society than corpora-
tions run by junk bond financed raiders like Carl Icahn, T. Boone Pick-
ens, Asher Edleman, Saul Steinberg, or Samuel Heyman, regardless of
whether shareholders benefit.
So understood, the debate over the "just say no" defense has both a
judicial and a political side. The judicial side, which reflects traditional
notions of corporate governance, should be quite inhospitable to argu-
ments for target management veto power. For all of the reasons that the
litany of justifications fails, shareholders should be free to decide whether
to accept or refuse a hostile offer. Larger issues concerning the allocation
of political, social and economic power within a democracy are not the
province of the Delaware courts.
The political side of the "just say no" defense-that is, the role of
the corporation as an intermediate social force between government and
the individual-is appropriately directed at Congress, whose members are
politically accountable for the political decisions they make. The best
thing lawyers can do with respect to this side of the debate is to insure
that the political substance of the issue is not obscured by rhetorical slo-
gans like short-term management.
14. See Romano, Metapolitics and Corporate Law Reform, 36 STAN. L. REV. 923, 936
(1984).
15. Id. at 937 (quoting A. BERLE, THE TWENTIETH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 148
(1955)).
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